

Yuriy Danyk

*Major General, Professor, Doctor of Engineering Sciences
Chief of Institute of Information Technologies
Ivan Chernyakhovsky National Defense University of Ukraine*

Maryna Semenkova

Lecturer, Ivan Chernyakhovsky National Defense University of Ukraine

MIGRATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HYBRID WARFARE AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT

Abstract

The population's potential for the protest or for the conflict can be used as the method of the hybrid warfare in the target country or region. The frustrations are formed due to the actual or virtually created resentment in the community or among the population groups. The deterioration of the social and economic conditions and the lack of opportunities to change the life for the better, the growing possibility of the realization of threat to the vital interests of people caused the intensive migration processes in many regions of the world that are now the one of the main characteristic features nowadays. The intensification of the migration processes is resulted from the peculiarities of the hybrid conflicts such as the powerful cognitive, information and psychological influence, using different technologies including the manipulative ones. The possibility to manage the migration processes and, in certain extent, the migrants' potential for conflict is becoming the feasible instrument to break down the system of regional and international security through the projection of conflicts to the places where the migration flows are directed.

Key words: migration, horizontal inequality, hybrid conflict, cognitive influence

Armed conflicts are usually accompanied by the intensification of migration processes both within and between the countries. During the II World war and the first post-war years there were more than 60 million migrants-refugees. Since 1945 we have been witnessing the tendency when the conflicts within the countries prevail but they are accompanied by the intensified migration processes too. Migration flows mostly caused by the internal conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Nigeria lead to the European Migration Crisis¹. In the context of globalization, that has been gathering its pace since the end of the World War II, we have fewer circumstances now that can restrain and control the migration flows. That's why the problem of migrant impact mitigation is the high priority issue for many countries of the world, first of all for the United States, Germany, the Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, etc.

Міграційні процеси in the context of the hybrid warfare have their peculiarities that depend on the nature of the contemporary hybrid conflicts. Mass displacement can create favourable conditions for the both spontaneous and manageable social and political tensions and, consequently, to the outbreak of the secondary waves of conflict. One of the mechanisms of the outbreak of tension, contradictions and conflicts is based on the transformation of horizontal

¹ Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe Humanitarian Situation Report (2017) <https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/>; Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries Report prepared for the UNHCR (December 2015) <https://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf>

inequality between the migrants and the members of local community. These contradictions and tensions are strengthened by the application of the destabilizing propaganda and can be used by some actors for the achieving some specific goals.

There is a quantity of research works where the nexus between the migration and conflict is investigated, but they are devoted to the armed conflicts of high intensity, when people leave their place of living because of the insecurity, damaging of housing, absence of the social services, etc. However, in spite of the fact that a number of today's conflicts are the hybrid ones, we cannot present the works where the nexus between the peculiarities of the hybrid conflicts and the horizontal inequality transformation between the migrants and the local residents has been investigated.

Nevertheless both hybrid warfare and migration are the objects of careful consideration and the number of scientific works, that investigate the various aspects of migration and hybrid warfare, is essential. Among others are W. Lind, K. Nightengale, J. Schmitt, J. Sutton, G. Wilson F. Hoffman, W. Murrey, P. Mansura, J. Mattis, J. McCuen², and Ukrainian scientists such as V. Gorbulin, O. Lytvynenko, D. Feldman, Y. Magda, G. Pocheptsov, I. Rushchenko, etc³. The above questions in the context of forecast views of the modern military conflicts peculiarities and their possible nature were considered in the works of⁴.

Many international organizations and non-governmental agencies are focused on the migration processes, the migrants, internally displaced people and refugees' problems and needs. They constantly monitor the current situation in the world and publish the statistical and analytical reports⁵. These issues are also covered in the works of D. Goldstone, M. Crawford, T. Hatton, D. Williamson, F. Docquier, O. Poznjak, O. Vojtjuk, etc⁶. The research work of G. Oustby, F. Stewart, D. Horowitz, L. Mancini, T. Gurr and G. Brown are devoted to the aspects of horizontal inequality within and between states⁷. Certain aspects of the manipulation by the social

² W. Lind, K. Nightengale, J. Schmitt, J. Sutton, G. Wilson (1989), *"The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation"*, Marine Corps Gazette 73 no. 10: 22-26; Hoffman F, (2007) *Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars*. Arlington, 72 p.; F. Hoffman *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges* // Joint Force Quarterly. – 2009. – 1st Quarter. – No 52. – P. 34–39; W. Murray, P. Mansoor, (2012) *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present* - New York, 329 p.; J. Mattis (2005) *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* P. 18–19; J. McCuen (2008) *Hybrid Wars* // Military Review, P. 107–113.

³ *Світова гібридна війна: український фронт: монографія / за заг. ред. В.П. Горбуліна.* – К. : НІСД, 2017. – 496 с; Danyk Y., Maliarchuk T., Briggs Ch. (2017) *Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts*, Connections. The Quarterly Journal. Vol. 16, No. 2. P. 5–24. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326478>; Почепцов Г. (2015) *Інструментарій хаосу в гібридній війні* http://www.jimagazine.lviv.ua/2015/Pocheptsov_Instrumentarij_haosu_v_hybrid_vijni.htm; Магда Є, (2015), *Гібридна війна: вижити і перемогти.*, X, 304 с; Рущенко І. (2015) *Російсько-українська гібридна війна: погляд соціолога*, Харків, 268 с.

⁴ Даник Ю. Г., Телелим В. М., Чмельов В. О. (2008), *Превентивна оборона як вид стратегічних дій*. Наука і оборона. №4. С. 34–41; Даник Ю. Г., Телелим В. М., Чмельов В. О. (2010) *Основні аспекти стратегії превентивної оборони та її реалізації* Наука і оборона, № 2. С. 15–23; Даник Ю. Г., Дузь–Крютченко О. П., Телелим В. М. та ін (2015), *Основи стратегії національної безпеки і оборони держави*, Київ, 620 с.

⁵ Див. напр. Global Migration Indicators, 2018 IOM, - available at http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global_migration_indicators_2018.pdf; World Migration Report, Internally displaced people http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_update_idps.pdf

⁶ M. Crawford, B. Campbell (eds.) (2012) *Causes and Consequences of Human Migration. An Evolutionary Perspective*. New York, 550 p.; M. Gibney, A. Claire, J. McCann, (1996). *Refugee Flows, the Internally Displaced and Political Violence (1908-1993): An Exploratory Analysis.*; О. Позняк, Є Лібанова (2010) *Населення України. Трудова еміграція в Україні*, Київ, 233 с.

⁷ T. Gurr, (1970) *Why men rebel*. Princeton, 438 p.; G. Ostby, (2008) *Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict*. Journal of Peace Research 45(2): pp.143-162; L. Mancini, *Horizontal inequality and communal violence: evidence from Indonesian districts*, in: F. Stewart (ed.) *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict:*

consciousness were studied by W. Lind, K. Nightengale, J. Schmitt, J. Sutton, G. Wilson, F. Zimbardo, G. Shiller, O. Томпсоном, C. Miller, O. Bojko, S. Kara-Murza, G. Potcheptsov, etc.⁸. We also have to mention the publications devoted to the consequences of being in a war zone for the personality and consciousness of individuals. They are the research works of H. Achmedova, O. Lazebna, M. Zelenova, etc.⁹.

The purpose of this article is to find out in what way the migration processes and horizontal inequality in migrants' communities on the probability of the secondary waves of conflicts and, besides, if they can be used deliberately for that. To this end we must study the peculiarities of the migration processes in the context of the hybrid conflict and, in particular, what categories of citizens leave their permanent place of residence, why they leave it and where they mostly seek to get to. Accordingly we must determine the prerequisites that are created after these particular people have migrated to these particular places. Besides we need to find out the way these prerequisites can be used in the context of the hybrid aggression and at the same time for the achievement of the hybrid aggression's goals.

The existence of the danger to life and the health hazards forces the number of people to leave the armed conflict zone. Of 150 million migrants in the world 71,4 are the forced ones. Among them are both refugees and internally displaced persons¹⁰. In spite the fact that the number of conflicts has been constantly decreasing since 2001 the number of forced migrants is getting higher. So, the number of forced migrants has increased by 63% comparing to the 2001¹¹. The forced migrants comprise 1% of the world's population. However, what the most critically for us as for the researchers to evaluate and analyze is the consequences of forced migrants concentration in some areas, especially comparing to the unconstrained ones and to the locals.

According to the researchers there is also the inverse link – the number of cases when migration contributed to the beginning or the escalation of conflicts is increasing¹². After the conflict has emerged, the probability for the new conflict to emerge in countries near the conflict affected one is three times higher than in remote countries¹³. Although the majority of refugees,

Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies Basingstoke: New York, p. 388; F. Stewart, (2000) *Crisis prevention: Tackling horizontal inequalities*. Oxford Development Studies, 28(3), pp. 245–262.

⁸ Шиллер Г. (1980) *Манипуляторы сознанием* М., 325 с.; С. Miller (1946) *The Process of Persuasion*. - New York, 1946.; Thomson, O. (1999). *Easily led: A history of propaganda*. Phoenix, 360 p.; О. Бойко (2010) *Політичне маніпулювання*, Київ, 432 с.; С. Кара-Мурза (2005) *Манипуляция сознанием*. – М., 832 с.; Danyk Y. G. Permiakov O.Y. (2018). *Modern information technologies in providing national security and defence: current state and development trends*. "Modern Information Technologies in the Sphere of Security and Defence". № 1(31) pp.159-176; Danyk Y., Gudz S. Special operations for disruption of state and military control system. Security and Defence Quarterly, published by War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland. 2015. № 4(9). URL: <https://securityanddefence.pl/resources/html/article/details?id=124640>.

⁹ Ахмедова Х. Б. (2004) *Посттравматические личностные изменения у гражданских лиц, переживших угрозу жизни* // Вопросы психологии. № 3. – С. 93–102; Ахмедова Х. Б. (2003) *Человек в экстремальных условиях. Мирные жители в условиях военных действий: личностные черты и расстройства адаптации* / Психологический журнал. Т. 24, № 3. – С. 37–45.; Лазебная Е. О. (1999) *Военно-травматический стресс: особенности посттравматической адаптации участников боевых действий* // Психологический журнал, Т. 20, № 5. – С. 62–74.

¹⁰ UNCHR Global Report 2017 http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2017/pdf/GR2017_English_Full_lowres.pdf, p.7.

¹¹ *Forced displacement worldwide* <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-highest-decades.html>

¹² С. Koppell, A. Sharma, (2003) *Preventing the Next Wave of Conflict - Understanding Non-Traditional Threats to Global Stability* - Washington, p. 61.

¹³ L. Chauvet, P. Collier, (2005) *Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds*, <http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC16180.htm>.

forced displaced people and migrants don't take part in the conflict, the migrants' flows are able to spread the on-going conflict and the migrants' movement can destabilize the security system in the country and in the region as a whole. As one of the most striking and well-known example we can present the Great Lakes region in Africa, where the movement of Hutu and Tutsi over the frontier because of the internal conflict in Rwanda (and Burundi) caused the series of conflicts in Congo (Zaire) and, after Hutu and Tutsi returned, - the repeated emergence and intensification of conflict in Rwanda. The majority of refugees move within their own countries or to other ones that are fragile too. However, even in relatively stable countries refugees and migrants are able to create the situations that are threatening to the social and political stability.

The hybrid conflict, even in case of its low intensity or the absence of hostilities, can be accompanied by the active movement of people. The existence of the prerequisites for the conflict to be renewed or to be escalated, the creation of the political, social and economic problems and contradictions by the aggressor, the uncertainty about the future of the region they live in, cause the feelings of insecurity, hopelessness, etc.

As a result people decide to leave their homes in the quest for the more prosperous places. Contrary to those who leave the violent conflict zone first of all in search for the safe places, the inhabitants of the hybrid conflict zone try to get to the places that are economically attractive, for example economic and trade centers, big cities, etc. Naturally, people who go to such attractive places are going to stay there as long as possible, but not to come back as soon as their place of residence becomes safe again. Besides, only those who think they have enough saving to live out at the new location or that they are able to become successfully integrated into a new society due to available qualification level, experience, knowledge, etc would dare to move to the highly urbanized economic centers both in the same country and in another one. There is one more category of people – the ones who expect to achieve their goals using the anti-social and illegal ways.

There is one more important difference – not all people leave the conflict zone, but only the pro-active part of population, mostly young and middle-aged. For example, during the conflict in Transdnistria women and children comprised 91,4% and children comprised 56,2% among all the people displaced to the Right Bank part of Moldova¹⁴, at the same time as a result of the conflict in Ukraine the number of older and disabled persons among the internally displaced persons in all the regions investigated is below the average in Ukraine. The young and middle-aged adults comprise the majority of internally displaced persons. Children under the age of 19 years comprise 29 %¹⁵. Moreover, the situation when people only registered on the territories that are under Ukrainian control in order to receive their pensions or welfare benefits but kept living where they actually lived. That's why their actual share can be lower than the official one.

Elderly people often refuse to move because they foresee their possible difficulties with the adaptation to the new conditions and in the new environment. They don't want to leave the place of habitual residence or don't want to abandon their property. On the other hand young people have another attitude to the same situation. They perceive it not as a traumatic one, but as a challenge or a new opportunity. They are focused on the self-realization and new achievements in a new place.

¹⁴ М. М. Слюсаревський, О.Є. Блинова (2013) *Психологія міграції*, Кіровоград, - с. 175.

¹⁵ *Національна система моніторингу ситуації з внутрішньо переміщеними особами, Міжнародна організація з міграції*, 2016, р. 4 http://www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/iom_nms_cumulative_report_ukr.pdf

Therefore, the motivation and the actions of people who leave the place of permanent residence because of the hybrid conflict is similar to the motivation of people who immigrate in search for jobs, higher income and better living conditions. They are ready for the change and want to adapt to the living in a new neighbourhood and in the new environment as much as immigrants are. At the same time there are some differences. First, people who migrate because of the conflict, inter alia the hybrid one wouldn't leave their place of living if there wasn't any conflict. They usually have permanent employment and income, certain position in the society habitual mode of life. There is one more category of migrants – they took part in conflict and they have been trained and have the specific military experience. Besides, some of them take on the unexplained inflated sense of self-worth or the sense of unfairness. Very often despite the absence of the required education and qualification they apply for and seek to get in whatever way the prestigious and high-paid jobs.

The massive displacement of people from the conflict zone to a new place of residence leads to the appearance of two notional groups - migrants and locals. Each of these groups has a certain level of intra-group inequality. The movement of a large number of people, getting them into the new conditions significantly increases the risk of a negative change in the level of group inequality. A change in the level between group inequalities can occur according to two scenarios. The first scenario assumes that people arrive at a new place of residence, they establish themselves in new society, eventually consolidate their positions and replace the locals in key positions. After a certain period of time, the social and economic situation of the newcomers becomes better than of the local population. The second scenario reflects the opposite situation: the vast majority of migrants do not adapt to the new environment and after a while find themselves in a worse socio-economic situation comparing to the locals'. Any of these scenarios presuppose that the risk of conflict in the regions that become the place of mass arrival of migrants is increasing, because in both situations the change of the inequality level causes the exasperation or frustration of the one group or another.

We can identify the conditions that make the first scenario possible. The mass arrival of migrants from the conflict zone is usually aggravated by the already high competition for prestigious jobs. However, in contrast to locals they are forced to exercise greater perseverance, agility and, sometimes, aggression in order to achieve their goal. People can resort to domestic and administrative corruption as a possible means of solving vital problems in conditions of severe competition, especially if the move was not planned and everything was not arranged in advance. As mentioned above, mainly proactive people of working age resort to migration, and their entry into new, complex conditions stimulates them and requires them to be even more active. (Theoretically), migrants are forced to work more, more persistently look for ways to move up the career ladder, expand the business because they have more expenses comparing to locals, they need to pay rent, etc. At the same time, the locals can afford to work less in case they have a passive income in the form of rent. If we are not talking about isolated cases, but about the mass phenomenon, in the event that the movement takes place within the same country or if migrants have equal employment opportunities, this may eventually lead to the replacement of a certain part of the key positions in the public and private sectors and to the improvement of the socio-economic situation of immigrants compared to the one of local population.

Governments or international agencies can sometimes create additional, motivated social conditions and benefits that are not available to local residents, such as cash benefits, housing, special employment programs and entrepreneurship development, etc for displaced persons. Local residents in the cities of Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya, that became the place of stay of a large number of refugees, while in their own country, felt themselves in a worse position than refugees. Refugees were provided with food and they received humanitarian aid. But the local people, who lived in the same poverty, did not. In addition, refugees were provided with medical, educational

and other services that were not available to most locals. Over time, locals started seeing refugees as the enemies who "skim the cream off" while the locals were in a difficult position¹⁶. Only due to the implementation of integrated programs that allowed the representatives of the host community to initiate entrepreneurial activities, including the provision of services to displaced persons, it became possible to prevent the explosion of violence.

The level of inequality and horizontal inequalities in particular is difficult to measure, in fact it is the subject of a separate study. In this case, when it comes to assessing the inequality between migrants and locals, it should be taken into account that migrants sometimes find it hard to get official jobs. They are often self-employed or work in the informal sector. For example, 20% of the interviewed migrant workers in Ukraine work formally, under an employment contract, others work by verbal agreement or consider themselves self-employed¹⁷. Locals, in turn, receive additional income in the form of payment for rental housing, which is often not displayed anywhere, etc.

Socio-economic benefits are transformed into political preferences, which in turn provide the opportunity for further socio-economic growth. Under these conditions, the members of the host community become hostile to refugees and tend to blame them for their problems. The resentment among the local population is caused not only for economic reasons. The ethnic, religious and linguistic structure of the region that hosts migrants is changing. It is also perceived as a threat factor and can destabilize social and political situation in society.

Thus, according to a sociological survey on the reasons for the resettlement of Ukrainian internally displaced persons, the process of resettlement takes place without significant social conflicts. But the conducted analysis draws attention to the presence of latent conflicts the respondents didn't talk about during answering the direct questions. But these conflicts showed themselves during the answers to other questions. These latent conflicts are linked with the differences in life philosophy and different emotional communication background of communication that is full of stereotypes¹⁸.

If people displaced from the conflict zone are mostly the representatives of the certain ethnic group, and after the movement to the region where another ethnic group has the leading position gradually start dominating – the possibility for conflict to break out will be even higher.

A different situation can be observed if the economy of the conflict-affected region differs from the economy of the place where the flows of forced migrants are directed. Large cities of the country are usually the financial-economic, educational and cultural centers, while peripheral regions are mostly industrial or agricultural ones. Thus, the displaced people face the problem of lack of jobs on their specialty in the labor market. Very often employers consider people who have moved as a result of the conflict as the unreliable workers who can leave at any time and who are not interested in the long-term employment. Moreover, if people move to another country, their non-citizenship often prevents them from occupying significant positions in the public and private sectors. Similarly, if young people with a certain level of education realize that they cannot count on particular positions because of the non-citizenship or because these posts are often semi-closed, with the restricted access.

¹⁶ P.Kenya, J.Kirui, *The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern* (2012) // International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 8, p. 164.

¹⁷ *Міграція в Україні: факти і цифри*, К., Представництво МОМ в Україні, - 2016, - с. 8.

¹⁸ О. Міхеєва, В.Середа, *Соціологічне дослідження "Сучасні українські внутрішньо переміщені особи: основні причини, стратегії переселення та проблеми адаптації"* <http://www.ostrovok.lg.ua/sociology/nauka/oksanamiheieva> -viktoria-sereda-sociologichne-doslidzhennya-suchasni-ukrayinski-vnutrishno

As a result of the first scenario, migrants have higher income over time and, accordingly, better status characteristics, as a result of the second scenario – the situation is the opposite. But both in the first and in the second cases, we observe the formation and strengthening of intergroup or horizontal inequality. The level of this inequality is not constant, but ranges from the tolerable level to the dangerous one and even the critical level. Such inter-group inequality can also arise in the case of the usual migration of people from the periphery to large trade and economic centers, when people migrate not in connection with the conflict, but due to the difference in wages and as for the other socio-economic issues.

But it is not always necessary for the intergroup contradictions to arise from the socio-economic differences that really exist. Very often they are formed due to the interpretations of socio-economic inequality in the consciousness of people. In the context of the hybrid conflicts it is often supposed to be done deliberately. The tension is artificially produced for instance due to the distorted perception of the existing state of affairs, when the achievements of people of certain social groups are perceived as the undeserved ones. The use of special technologies provides the opportunity to create and artificially untangle the chaos situation. At the beginning it can result in the peaceful protest actions and then turn them into a means to achieve the specific goal. In a context of the hybrid war, it can become a significant destabilizing factor¹⁹.

There is one more category of immigrants - mostly young men who took an active part in the conflict. It is quite natural that they are seeking a better life. They can be deliberately used to form a manageable horizontal inequality in the certain places.

If we are talking about a country or region in which there is a hybrid conflict and there is a conflicting party that is interested in further destabilization, then dissatisfaction and contradictions that arose as a result of changes in the level of horizontal inequality can be effectively used to destabilize the country or region.

In addition to the direct transformation of the level between group inequality, there are other factors that can increase the likelihood of a conflict. In our opinion, the most important of them is an increase in the proportion of youth in certain region and an increase in the level of urbanization. Thus, the natural or artificial concentration of a large mass of unemployed young people in a specific place is, as it follows from the theory of the predominance of youth, a prerequisite for the emergence of a conflict. The young people are relatively easy to be mobilized, especially the unemployed ones – they are receptive to new, sometimes even radical ideas, they still have no family and career commitments. Before moving to big city many of them don't have many needs. Then, after the moving they acquire new expectations, ambitions and demands. But after these expectations have not been met, young people might feel disgruntled and frustrated.

The movement of people to trade and economic centers within the country contributes to a further urban expansion. At the same time, if the level of urbanization exceeds the level of economic development, the risk of political instability increases. According to a study of political crises in South Africa that took place from 1955 to 1995, on other things being equal, the risk of a political crisis is more than twice as high if the level of urbanization is higher than the average, and the income per person is lower than the average²⁰. It should also be taken into account that the

¹⁹ І.П. Рущенко (2015) *Підривні соціальні технології у структурі гібридної війни* // *Право і безпека*, №2 (57), - с. 13.

²⁰ D. Esty, J. Goldstone, T. Gurr, B. Harff, M. Levy, G. Dabelko, P. Surko, A. Unger (1999) *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings Issue 5*, Washington, p.58.

conflict that occurs in a territory with a high urbanization level has a specific character and is more difficult to be resolved²¹.

Using this line of reasoning we would conclude that the hybrid conflict affects such aspects of migration as the migrants flows composition and the directions of their movements. As a result, the intergroup inequality between the newly arrived and locals emerges, which tends to change over time. On the other hand, in the context of the hybrid conflict there is a conflicting party (actor) that is interested in the undermining of the situation. It can use the discontent and the resentment of the certain group, which followed the change of the inequality level. Moreover, such discontent can be created artificially, first of all by taking advantage of the modern information technologies potential. For example, it can be done due to the by the virtual exaggeration of the actual level of inequality and social contradictions, or by promoting the certain narratives among the population. In this way, the protest potential is formed inside both local residents group and migrants group. Besides have the aggressive emotional states of the population, including feelings of anger, hostility, hatred, suspicion, etc., are initiated or exacerbated.

In its turn, the resentment that was both resulted of the actual circumstances or created artificially makes the basis and favorable environment for all kinds of unrest, for the the division of the society and the political elite in particular.

Moreover, even under the condition of external influence, the social unrest may seem like the grass-roots process. This factor is of the extreme importance, because the exploitation of the intergroup contradictions gives grounds for the conflict to be called “civil” despite the existence of external influence.

Consequently, in a hybrid conflict, migration and, as a consequence, transformation of intergroup inequality create the preconditions for moving the conflict or its development into a definite place, to cover the conflict of new regions and to delay new population groups. The presence of mechanisms of system analysis of these processes makes it possible to predict the likely centers of the emergence of stress and unrest, reduce their negative consequences and even prevent them from occurring through the development and implementation of a set of measures aimed at preventing the excessive level of intergroup inequality between displaced persons and the host community and conducting competent and well-informed information policy.

²¹ Ellen Brennan, (1999) *Population, Urbanization, Environment, and Security: A Summary of the Issues*, Washington, P. 16.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Brennan E, (1999) *Population, Urbanization, Environment, and Security: A Summary of the Issues*, Washington
2. Chauvet L., Collier P., (2005) Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds, <http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC16180.htm>.
3. Crawford M., Campbell B. (eds.) (2012) *Causes and Consequences of Human Migration. An Evolutionary Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
4. Danyk Y., Gudz S. (2015) Special operations for disruption of state and military control system. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, published by War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland. № 4(9). URL: <https://securityanddefence.pl/resources/html/article/details?id=124640>
5. Danyk Y., Maliarchuk T., Briggs Ch. (2017) Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts, Connections. *The Quarterly Journal*. Vol. 16, No. 2. P. 5–24. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326478>
6. Danyk Y. G. Permiakov O.Y. (2018). *Modern information technologies in providing national security and defence: current state and development trends*. “Modern Information Technologies in the Sphere of Security and Defence”. № 1(31) pp.159-176;
7. Esty D., Goldstone J., Gurr T., (1999) *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings* Washington.
8. Forced displacement worldwide <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-highest-decades.html>

9. Gibney M., Apodaca C., and McCann J., (1996), "Refugee Flows, the Internally Displaced and Political Violence (1908-1993): An Exploratory Analysis."
10. Global Migration Indicators, 2018 IOM, - available at http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global_migration_indicators_2018.pdf;
11. Gurr T. (1970) Why men rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. Hoffman F. (2007) Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
13. Hoffman F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges // Joint Force Quarterly. – 2009. – 1st Quarter. – No 52. – P. 34–39;
14. Koppell C., Sharma A., (2003) Preventing the Next Wave of Conflict - Understanding Non-Traditional Threats to Global Stability - Washington.
15. Kirui P., Mwaruvie J. The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North-Eastern Kenya International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 8 [Special Issue - April 2012] p. 164.
16. Lind W., Nightengale K., Schmitt J., Sutton J., Wilson G. (1989), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", *Marine Corps Gazette* 73 no. 10: 22-26; H4–39;
17. Mancini, L. Horizontal inequality and communal violence: evidence from Indonesian districts, in: F. Stewart (ed.) Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies Basingstoke: New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 388; Stewart, F. (2000) Crisis prevention: Tackling horizontal inequalities. *Oxford Development Studies*, 28(3), pp. 245–262.
18. Mattis J.N. Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars - Proceedings. – 2005. – November. – P. 18–19. 49;
19. McCuen J.J. Hybrid Wars / J.J. McCuen // *Military Review*. – 2008. – April-May. – P. 107–113.
20. Miller Clyde R. (1946) The Process of Persuasion. - N. Y.: Crown Publisher.
21. Murray W., Mansoor P. (2012) Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present - New York: Cambridge University Press.
22. Ostby G. (2008) Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* – 2008 45(2): pp.143-162;
23. Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe Humanitarian Situation Report (2017) <https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/>; Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries Report prepared for the UNHCR (December 2015) <https://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf>
24. Thomson O. (1999), *Easily led: A history of propaganda*. Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton – 360 p.
25. UNCHR Global Report 2017 http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2017/pdf/GR2017_English_Full_lowres.pdf, p.7.
26. World Migration Report, Internally displaced people http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_update_idps.pdf
27. Ахмедова Х. Б. Посттравматические личностные изменения у гражданских лиц, переживших угрозу жизни // *Вопросы психологии*. – 2004. – № 3. – С. 93–102;
28. Ахмедова Х. Б. Человек в экстремальных условиях. Мирные жители в условиях военных действий: личностные черты и расстройства адаптации / Х. Б. Ахмедова // *Психологический журнал*. – 2003. – Т. 24, № 3. – С. 37–45.;
29. Бойко О.Д. (2010) Політичне маніпулювання.

30. Даник Ю. Г., Телелим В. М., Чмельов В. О. (2008), Превентивна оборона як вид стратегічних дій. Наука і оборона. №4. С. 34–41;
31. Даник Ю. Г., Телелим В. М., Чмельов В. О. (2010) Основні аспекти стратегії превентивної оборони та її реалізації Наука і оборона, № 2. С. 15–23;
32. Даник Ю. Г., Дузь–Крятченко О. П., Телелим В. М. та ін (2015), Основи стратегії національної безпеки і оборони держави.
33. Жарков Я. М. (2013) Інформаційно-психологічне протиборство (еволюція та сучасність): монографія /Я. М. Жарков, В. М. Петрик, М. М. Присяжнюк.
34. Кара-Мурза С. Г. (2005) Манипуляция сознанием.
35. Лазебная Е. О. Военно-травматический стресс: особенности посттравматической адаптации участников боевых действий / Е. О. Лазебная, М. Е. Зеленова // Психологический журнал. – 1999. – Т. 20, № 5. – С. 62–74.
36. Міграція в Україні: факти і цифри, К., (2016), Представництво МОМ в Україні.
37. Міхеєва О., Серєда В., (2017) Соціологічне дослідження "Сучасні українські внутрішньо переміщені особи: основні причини, стратегії переселення та проблеми адаптації" <http://www.ostrovok.lg.ua/sociology/nauka/oksanamiheieva-viktoriya-sereda-sociologichne-doslidzhennya-suchasni-ukrayinski-vnutrishno>
38. Національна система моніторингу ситуації з внутрішньо переміщеними особами, Міжнародна організація з міграції, (2016) http://www.iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/iom_nms_cumulative_report_ukr.pdf
39. Позняк О., Лібанова Є (2010) Населення України. Трудова еміграція в Україні. – К.: Ін-т демографії та соціальних досліджень ім. М.В.Птухи НАН України.
40. Почепцов Г. Інструментарій хаосу в гібридній війні http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/2015/Pochepcov_Instrumentarij_haosu_v_hybrid_vijni.htm;
41. Світова гібридна війна: український фронт : монографія / за заг. ред. В.П. Горбуліна. – К. : НІСД, 2017. – 496 с;
42. Рущенко І. (2015) Російсько-українська гібридна війна: погляд соціолога.
43. Рущенко І.П. Підривні соціальні технології у структурі гібридної війни // Право і безпека. – 2015. - №2 (57), - с. 13.
44. Слюсаревський М. М., О.Є. Блинова (2013) Психологія міграції. Навчальний посібник.
45. Требін М. «Гібридна» війна як нова українська реальність // Український соціум. 2014. №3 (50) 113 – 127;
46. Шиллер Г. (1980) Манипуляторы сознанием